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• This paper studies a bilevel Hub Interdiction and trilevel Hub Protection Problem.
• We study efficient methods to reduce the bilevel problem to single level.
• We present different closest assignment constraints to enable this reduction.
• We propose a Benders Decomposition method that solves large interdiction problems.
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Abstract
In this paper, we present computationally efficient formulations for the multiple allocation hub
interdiction and hub protection problems, which are bilevel and trilevel mixed integer linear
programs, respectively. In the hub interdiction problem, the aim is to identify a subset of
r critical hubs from an existing set of p hubs that when interdicted results in the maximum
post-interdiction cost of routing flows. We present two alternate ways of reducing the bilevel
hub interdiction model to a single level optimization problem. The first approach uses the
dual formulation of the lower level problem. The second approach exploits the structure of the
lower level problem to replace it by a set of closest assignment constraints (CACs). We present
alternate sets of CACs, study their dominance relationships, and report their computational
performances. Further, we propose refinements to CACs that offer computational advantages
of an order-of-magnitude compared to the one existing in the literature. Further, our proposed
modifications offer structural advantages for Benders decomposition, which lead to substan-
tial computational savings, particularly for large problem instances. Finally, we study and
solve large scale instances of the trilevel hub protection problem exactly by utilizing the ideas
developed for the hub interdiction problem.
Keywords: Location, Hub-and-Spoke network, Interdiction, Protection, Benders
Decomposition.
1. Introduction
Certain infrastructural assets are critical to the functioning of a nation’s economy and so-
cietal well being. The United States’ Department of Homeland Security1 identifies sixteen
infrastructural sectors as critical, such that their incapacitation or destruction can be debili-
tating to the national security, economy, and public health (Brown et al., 2006). Three out
of these sixteen critical infrastructure sectors, namely transportation systems, communications
networks, and energy, employ hub-and-spoke as a dominant network structure because of its
operational advantage. Hub-and-spoke networks exploit the economies of scale arising from
consolidating the traffic from different origins and/or those destined to different demand points,
instead of serving each origin-destination (O-D) pair directly. Flows from the same origin with
different destinations in a hub-and-spoke network are consolidated on their route at the hub
where they are combined with flows that have different origins but the same destination (Camp-
bell, 1996). In multi-hub networks, traffic concentrated at a hub is directed to a second hub,
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which distributes it to the final destinations, thereby exploiting the economies of scale on the
inter-hub flows. Another advantage of a a hub-and-spoke network is that it results in fewer
links, which makes the network construction economical and its maintenance easier, compared
to an alternate network with direct connections between all origins and destinations.
Hub-and-spoke networks have been well studied, starting with the seminal paper by O’Kelly
(1986). Campbell (1994) presented integer programming formulations for the p-hub median,
uncapacitated hub location, p-hub center, and hub covering problems. These models are largely
inspired by their facility location counterparts, namely p-median, fixed charge facility location,
p-center, and maximal covering problems. Since then, the following variants of hub location
problems have been studied in the literature: single allocation (i.e. a non-hub is allocated to
only one hub) or multiple allocation (i.e. a non-hub is allocated to one or more than one hub),
uncapacitated (no limit on hub capacity) or capacitated (hubs have a fixed capacity). Ernst and
Krishnamoorthy (1996), Skorin-Kapov et al. (1996), Ebery et al. (2000), Hamacher et al. (2004)
are some of the important works in this area. In recent years, several newer variations of the
hub location problems have appeared in the literature. Notable among those are: hub location
with congestion (Elhedhli and Hu, 2005); hub location with service level constraints (Jayaswal
and Vidyarthi, 2013); cycle hub location problem (Contreras et al., 2016); tree of hubs location
problem (Contreras et al., 2010); hub location with flow dependent economies of scale (O’Kelly
and Bryan, 1998); hub location with stochastic demands (Contreras et al., 2011b); modular
hub location problem (Tanash et al., 2017); and dynamic hub location (Contreras et al., 2011c).
Reviews of the hub location literature can be found in: Alumur and Kara (2008), Campbell and
O’Kelly (2012) and Farahani et al. (2013).
While hub-and-spoke network structure is attractive due to its cost effectiveness, it is prone
to severe disruptions in the event of a failure of any of its hubs due to either random events or de-
liberate attacks (called interdiction). For example, the recent (January 2017) snowstorm, named
Egon, that hit continental Europe caused the international hubs at Heathrow and Frankfurt
to close, severely disrupting airline operations2. O’Kelly (2015) points out that hub-and-spoke
networks exhibit a non-random pattern of node degree, with some hub nodes exhibiting very
high connectivity, while many others connected to very few other nodes. An attack at a node
chosen at random would most likely do little damage due to the preponderance of low degree
nodes, but a deliberate effort to disable (interdict) one of the very high degree nodes (hubs)
could be devastating (Albert et al., 2002). A study states that it is possible to disrupt the entire
United States’ air network by interdicting just 2% of its all airports (Lewis, 2006). Thus, it
becomes necessary to identify such critical hubs in advance so that resources may be deployed
for their protection to minimize disruptions.
In this paper, we present optimization models to identify vulnerability and build resilience
in hub-and-spoke networks to interdiction or extreme incidents. More specifically, the first
model studied is a hub interdiction problem (HIP) that identifies critical hubs in hub-and-spoke
networks. The second model, called the hub protection problem (HPP), allocates protective re-
sources among critical hubs so that they can be fortified against interdiction. Several classes of
HIPs and HPPs may arise depending on the settings of the problem and the underlying assump-
tions of the model. In this paper, we study the r-hub median interdiction problem (r-HMIP) and
u-hub median protection problem (u-HMPP) in a multiple allocation hub-and-spoke network














in a hub-and-spoke network, which when interdicted leads to maximal disruption to the system.
In u-HMPP, the decision maker seeks to fortify/protect a subset of u hubs from an existing
set of p hubs against interdiction. We present efficient formulations and solution approaches
for the two models. More specifically, we present a bilevel mixed-integer programming (MIP)
model for r-HMIP, followed by two alternate ways of reducing it to a single-level optimization
problem. The first approach uses the dual formulation of the lower level min-cost hub rout-
ing problem to combine it with the upper level. The second approach exploits the fact that in
hub-and-spoke networks satisfying (i) triangular inequality between every pair of nodes, and (ii)
identical economies of scale (represented by a common discount factor) on all inter-hub links,
a path between any origin-destination (O-D) pair can have at most two hubs Campbell and
O’Kelly (2012). Hence, the total number of paths available in the network is polynomial, which
can be enumerated. Therefore, the lower level problem can be replaced by closest assignment
constraints (CACs), which ensure that the flow between any O-D pair happens through the
least cost path among the polynomial number of available paths post-interdiction. We present
alternate sets of CACs and study their dominance relationships. Our proposed refinements to
CACs offer computational advantages of order-of-magnitude compared to the one existing in
the literature. Further, our CACs offer structural advantages that are explored while applying
Benders decomposition to efficiently solve large instances of r-HMIP. Benders decomposition
offers further computational advantage of orders-of-magnitude over the direct solution of the
single-level r-HMIP with CACs. Finally, we present a trilevel MIP formulation of u-HMPP,
and reduce it to bilevel MIP using the proposed CACs. We also present an implicit enumer-
ation algorithm in combination with Benders decomposition for u-HMPP. The computational
advantage gained for r-HMIP by using CACs and Benders decomposition allowed us to further
solve large instances of an otherwise intractable u-HMPP.
The major contributions of the paper are as follows:
• We present alternate ways of reducing the bilevel r-HMIP to single level using different
sets of CACs that are more efficient than the one existing in the literature.
• We further present Benders decomposition for the different single-level formulations to
efficiently solve large instances of r-HMIP.
• Further, using the above contributions, we solve large instances of u-HMPP using a com-
bination of implicit enumeration and benders decomposition procedure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief review of
literature on network interdiction and protection problems. Section 3 describes the hub inter-
diction problem (r-HMIP), and presents its bilevel formulation, followed by two alternate ways
of reducing it to single level. Subsection 3.2 presents the single-level reduction by taking dual
of the lower level routing problem, whereas Subsection 3.3 presents the single-level reduction
using three alternative sets of CACs. The dominance relationships between CACs is described
in Subsection 3.4. We further present two reduced formulations of CACs in Subsection 3.5. The
computational comparisons of all the single-level reformulations of r-HMIP are reported in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 describes Benders decomposition for the different reformulations of r-HMIP. In
Section 6, we present the trilevel model for u-HMPP, followed by a solution methodology using















Interdiction refers to the forbidding or halting of an intelligent adversary’s activity through
an intentional attack. Interdiction problems involve two players, namely an attacker (also
called interdictor) and a defender (also called evader). Such problems have been widely studied
with respect to network flows (network interdiction) and facility location-allocation (facility
interdiction) problems. The decision maker in an interdiction problem is interested in identifying
the set of nodes/arcs (in network interdiction) or facilities (in facility interdiction) that when
interdicted causes the maximum disruption/loss to the system. The problem is modeled as a
Stackleberg game in which the attacker is the leader and the defender is the follower. The
literature on interdiction can be broadly categorized into three groups: network interdiction,
facility interdiction, and hub interdiction.
2.1. Network Interdiction
Network interdiction problems identify critical nodes or arcs in a network. The defender op-
erates on the network to optimize her objective such as: (i) to pass through the network as fast
as possible (shortest path network interdiction) (Corley and Sha, 1982; Israeli and Wood, 2002;
Cappanera and Scaparra, 2011); (ii) to move through the network without getting caught (most
reliable path interdiction) (Morton et al., 2007); (iii) to maximize the amount of flow passing
through the network (maximum flow network interdiction) (Wood, 1993; Cormican et al., 1998).
The objectives of the attacker in these models are: (i) to intercept or destroy the arc(s)/node(s)
so as to maximize the length of the shortest path; (ii) to maximize the probability of detection
in the network; (iii) to minimize the maximum flow in the network. These models find ap-
plications in disrupting enemy flows (McMasters and Mustin, 1970), infectious disease control
(Assimakopoulos, 1987), counter-terrorism (Farley, 2003), interception of nuclear material (Pan
and Morton, 2008; Gutfraind et al., 2009), and contraband smuggling (Washburn and Wood,
1995). A review of network interdiction models with applications can be found in Collado and
Papp (2012).
In one of the early papers in this area, Wood (1993) presented a network interdiction prob-
lem in which an enemy attempts to maximize flow through a capacitated network, while an
interdictor tries to minimize this maximum flow by interdicting arcs using limited resources. He
presented integer programming formulations for the discrete interdiction case, and presented
valid inequalities and derived a reformulation to tighten the LP relaxation of some of these
models. Extension of the model to allow for continuous interdiction, multiple origins and des-
tinations, undirected networks, multiple interdiction resources, and multiple commodities are
also described. Smith et al. (2007) presented a three-stage model for designing a survivable
network under several interdiction scenarios. In particular, they examine the case in which an
enemy, subject to some interdiction budget, can destroy any portion of any arc that a designer
constructs on the network. The problem is modeled using a two-player game, in which the de-
signer acts first to construct a network and transmit an initial set of flows through the network.
The enemy acts next to destroy a set of constructed arcs in the designer’s network followed by
the designer who acts last to transmit a final set of flows in the network. They present solution
approaches for three different profiles of enemy action: (i) based on arc capacities, (ii) based on
initial flows, and (iii) interdiction to minimize the network designer’s maximum profit obtained
from transmitting flows. Lim and Smith (2007) studied the multicommodity flow network in-
terdiction problem, in which an attacker disables, subject to an interdiction budget, a set of













commodities in the network. The authors examine the problem under: (i) discrete interdiction
(i.e., an interdicted arc is completely disabled), and (ii) continuous interdiction (an interdicted
arc is not completely destroyed, but operates with reduced capacity).
2.2. Facility Interdiction and Protection
Facility interdiction problems identify critical facilities in a supply network, which when
destroyed causes maximum disruption. Church et al. (2004) proposed r -interdiction median
problem (r-IMP) and r -interdiction covering problem (r-ICP) to study interdiction of facilities
under different location scenarios. The r-IMP identifies a subset of r facilities to remove from an
existing set of p facilities so as to maximize the overall transportation cost of serving customers
from the remaining facilities post-interdiction. On the other hand, r-ICP identifies a subset of r
facilities from an exisiting set of p facilities that when removed minimizes the total demand that
can be covered within a specific distance or time. Different variants of r-IMP have been studied
in the literature. Church and Scaparra (2007a) studied an extension of the problem where
the success of the attack is uncertain. The authors assumed that the attacks are successful
with a given probability. Losada et al. (2012) studied another type of uncertainty in r-IMP,
which is the uncertainty in the degree of impact from an attack. This problem identifies the
disruption scenario that result in the maximum overall transportation distance for serving all
customers in the system. A key assumption here is that the degree of interdiction impact
on a facility is proportional to the amount of reorigins employed. The problems described
above assume no restrictions on the capacity of the facilities. Aksen et al. (2014) studied a
partial interdiction of capacitated r -IMP, wherein facilities operate with a reduced capacity post-
interdiction. Though various versions of r -IMP are studied (capacitated and uncapacitated,
partial and full interdiction), their r -ICP counterparts have received limited attention in the
literature.
Church and Scaparra (2007b) studied an extension of r -IMP, known as r -interdiction median
problem with fortification (r -IMF), which identifies optimal fortification/protection strategies
against interdiction. The model assumes that a protected/fortified facility becomes completely
immune to attacks. Scaparra and Church (2008a) formulated r -IMF as a bilevel MIP, which
is solved using an implicit enumeration algorithm. Scaparra and Church (2008b) proposed
an alternate method for r -IMF based on its reformulation as a single level maximal covering
problem with precedence constraints. The authors devise an approximate heuristic to identify
the upper and lower bound to the problem, which are used to reduce the size of the original
problem. This reduced problem is then solved to optimality using a commercial MIP solver.
Aksen et al. (2010), Losada et al. (2010), Scaparra and Church (2012), Liberatore et al. (2012),
Aksen and Aras (2012), and Aksen et al. (2013) are other related works in this area.
2.3. Hub Interdiction and Protection
Interdiction of hubs in a hub-and-spoke network has received scarce attention in the litera-
ture, despite its many useful applications, as discussed in Section 1. However, there have been a
few studies in closely related areas. An et al. (2015) and Azizi et al. (2016), for example, studied
the reliable hub-and-spoke network design problem, which includes the possibility of re-routing
flows through backup hubs when the active hubs are disrupted. However, the objective in both
these papers is to minimize the weighted sum of pre-disruption and the expected value (over all
disruption scenarios) of post-disruption transportation cost. Chaharsooghi et al. (2017) stud-
ied the reliable uncapacitated multiple allocation hub location problem under hub disruptions.













hubs are either reassigned to other surviving hubs or they do not receive service, in which case
a penalty should be paid. The problem is modeled as a two-stage stochastic program, and a
metaheuristic algorithm based on the adaptive large neighborhood search is proposed. HIPs by
contrast, study the worst-case loss to the defender.
In terms of the problem studied in this paper, Lei (2013), Parvaresh et al. (2014), Ghaf-
farinasab and Motallebzadeh (2017), and Ghaffarinasab and Atayi (2017) are the closest to our
work. Lei (2013) presented a bilevel and a trilevel formulation for r-HMIP and u-HMPP, re-
spectively. However, due to the complexity of the problem, computational results are presented
only for small instances of r-HMIP, and none for u-HMPP. Parvaresh et al. (2014) presented two
multi-objective metaheuristics based on simulated annealing and tabu search to solve the prob-
lem. More recently, Ghaffarinasab and Motallebzadeh (2017) studied r-HMIP, along with r-hub
interdiction maximal covering and r-hub interdiction center problems, and solved them using
simulated annealing techniques. Ghaffarinasab and Atayi (2017) presented an implicit enumer-
ation algorithm for r-HMIP and a two level implicit enumeration algorithm for u-HMPP (one
level of implicit enumeration for interdiction and another level for protection). Our paper differs
from these papers essentially in terms of the solution method to efficently solve large instances
of r-HMIP and u-HMPP. In contrast to Ghaffarinasab and Atayi (2017), which used implicit
enumeration to solve the bilevel r-HMIP, we present alternate ways to reduce the problem to
single level, and to solve them efficiently using Benders decomposition. Ghaffarinasab and Mo-
tallebzadeh (2017), similar to us, used alternate sets of CACs to reduce the bilevel r-HMIP to
a single level. However, we further study in detail the dominance relations among the various
CACs, and also present their reduced versions, which make the resulting single level formulation
computationally very efficient. We further exploit the structure of the resulting alternate single
level formulations of r-HMIP in Benders decomposition to further reduce the computational
times. Benders decomposition for r-HMIP also allows us to further improve the efficiency of
the implicit enumeration used for solving u-HMPP.
3. Problem Description and Model Formulation for r-HMIP
Consider a multiple allocation hub-and-spoke network with a set H Ď N of p hubs. Suppose
that the follower (defender) has a set of flows (Wij) between every origin node i P N and
destination node j P N , which is routed through one or at most two of the hubs from the set
H. Let dijkm represent the cost per unit flow from the origin i to destination j, through hubs
k and m, in that order. Then, dijkm “ αcik ` δckm ` γcmj , where α, δ, and γ are the discount
factors on collection, transhipment, and distribution links, respectively and cik, ckm, and cmj
represent the cost of traversing from node i to k, k to m, and m to j, respectively. Typically,
δ ă α and δ ă γ due to economies of scale arising from consolidation of flows on inter-hub links.
We model r-HMIP as a Stackleberg game in which the leader (attacker) makes the first
move by interdicting a subset of r hubs from the existing set H of p hubs with the objective
to maximize the follower’s (defender’s) optimal routing/transportation cost through the p ´ r
surviving hubs in the network post-interdiction. We assume r ă p since the attacker usually has
limited resources to interdict the hubs. We also assume that an interdicted hub is completely
disabled, i.e., partial flows through an interdicted hub is not permitted. We formulate this game
as a bilevel MIP. The hierarchical structure of the problem is shown in Figure 1.
3.1. Bilevel Programming Formulation
In this subsection, we provide a mathematical formulation for r-HMIP. To begin with, we
















Objective: Minimize routing cost after interdiction
Objective: Maximize the defender’s routing cost
Decision: Which r hubs to interdict?
Decision: How to route the flows through the remaining hubs?
Variable type: Binary
Variable type: Continuous
Level 1: Attacker’s problem (Hub interdiction)
Level 2: Defender’s problem (Routing problem)
Figure 1: Hub interdiction problem as a bilevel MIP
Indices and Parameters:
N : Set of all nodes
H : Set of all hubs, H Ď N
i : Index for origin nodes, i P N
j : Index for destination nodes, j P N
k : Index for hub which is connected to origin nodes, k P H
m : Index for hub which is connected to destination nodes, m P H
α ; Discount factor for collection (origin to hub), piÑ kq
δ ; Discount factor for transhipment (hub to hub), pk Ñ mq
γ ; Discount factor for distribution (hub to destination), pmÑ jq
Wij : Demand (of flow) from origin i to destination j
cij : Cost of traversing from node i to j
dijkm : Cost of traversing from the origin i to destination j, through hubs k and m;
dijkm “ αcik ` δckm ` γcmj
p : No. of open hubs in the system
r : No. of hubs to interdict.
Decision Variables:
Xijkm : Fraction of flows from origin i to destination j through hubs k and m post-interdiction
zk : 1 if hub k survives interdiction (is not interdicted), 0 otherwise
With the above notation, the bilevel formulation of the multiple allocation r-HMIP can be







zk “ p´ r (2)


































Xijmk ď zk @i, j P N ; k P H (6)
Xijkm ě 0 @i, j P N ; k,m P H (7)
The leader’s (attacker’s) objective function (1) maximizes the defender’s optimal total trans-
portation cost post-interdiction, which the follower wants to minimize in its objective function
(4). Constraint (2) ensures that p´ r hubs remain open post-interdiction. (4) to (7) form the
follower’s problem at the lower level. Constraint set (5) ensures that the demand between every
O-D pair (i, j) is satisfied using paths containing at most two hubs, while constraint set (6)
ensures that this demand is routed only via surviving hubs post-interdiction. Constraint set (6)
can be alternatively represented by the following two sets of constraints, as done by Lei (2013).ÿ
kPH
Xijkm ď zm @ i, j P N ;m P H;ÿ
mPH
Xijkm ď zk @ i, j P N ; k P H.
However, the constraint set of the form (6) has been proven to be facet defining (Hamacher
et al., 2004). Hence, constraint set (6) provides a tighter linear programming (LP) relaxation,
which is effective in solving large instances of r-HMIP. Note that the lower level problem in the
above formulation is a linear program (LP) as a result of multiple allocation of non-hub nodes
to hubs.
Bilevel optimization problems, even with linear programs at both levels, are known to be
NP-hard (Frangioni, 1995; Audet et al., 1997). As such, they are traditionally solved by reducing
the problem to single-level using various reduction techniques (Sinha et al., 2017). In this paper,
we present two alternate ways of reducing the bilevel r-HMIP to a single-level MIP such that
it is tractable. The first approach is based on the dual of the lower level LP, while the second
approach exploits the structure of the solution to the lower level problem so that it can be
replaced by CACs.
3.2. Single-level Reduction using Dual Formulation
In the bilevel formulation r-HMIP2L, the lower level problem given by (4)-(7), is an LP.
Further, since the objective functions at the two levels are the same, while their objectives
are exactly opposite (maximization for the upper level and minimization for the lower level),
r-HMIP2L can be reduced to a single-level MIP by taking the dual of the lower level LP. For
a fixed upper level variable z¯k, associating dual variables φij and δijk with constraint sets (5)















s.t. φij ´ δijk ďWijdijkm @i, j P N ;@k,m P H, k “ m
φij ´ δijk ´ δijm ďWijdijkm @i, j P N ;@k,m P H, k ‰ m













Replacing the lower level problem with the above dual gives the following single level nonlinear


















zk “ p´ r (9)
φij ´ δijk ďWijdijkm @i, j P N ;@k,m P H, k “ m (10)
φij ´ δijk ´ δijm ďWijdijkm @i, j P N ;@k,m P H, k ‰ m (11)
φij unbounded; δijk ě 0; zk P t0, 1u @i, j P N ;@k P H (12)




j δijkzk in its objective function (8), which can be
linearized by introducing a new variable Vk and the following two constraint sets:






δijk ´Mkp1´ zkq @k P H (14)
where Mk is a sufficiently large number. The linearized single-level dual formulation of r-HMIP
is given by:












Vk ě 0 @k P H (16)
The computational efficiency of the above formulation depends on the specific value of Mk
chosen for the problem. A good value of Mk provides a tighter LP relaxation of the model. In
the following proposition, we present a valid value of Mk.
Proposition 1. For a given O-D pair pi, jq, let dijk1m1 “ maxk,mtdijkmu and dijkm2 “
minmtdijkmu. Then, ĎMk “ řiPN řjPN Wij pdijk1m1 ´ dijkm2q is a valid value of Mk for r-
HMIPDF .
Proof.








(since δijk is the shadow price of constraint (6), which is obtained as the maximum possible
change in the objective function (4) corresponding to a change in the right hand side of constraint
(6) by a unit).














3.3. Single-level Reduction using CACs
In this subsection, we present an alternate way of reducing the bilevel r-HMIP to a single
level optimization problem by exploiting the structure of the lower level LP. For a given solution
to the upper level problem (i.e., for fixed values of zk), the lower level problem separates into
an independent min-cost routing problem for every O-D pair pi, jq. The minimum cost routing
requirement between every O-D pair pi, jq can also be ensured through additional constraints in
absence of the objective function, which allows the reduction of r-HMIP2L to single level. Such
constraints have been widely used in facility location problems to allocate customers to their
closest facilities, and are popularly called as CACs. Gerrard and Church (1996) and Espejo
et al. (2012) compare different CACs used in location problems, and study their theoretical
properties. These constraints find applications in hazardous facility location problems (Song
et al., 2013), facility location problems under competition (Dobson and Karmarkar, 1987), and
facility interdiction problems (Liberatore et al., 2011), among others.
In hub-and-spoke networks satisfying (i) triangular inequality between every pair of nodes,
and (ii) identical economies of scale (represented by a common discount factor δ) on all inter-
hub links, a path between any O-D pair can have at most two hubs. Hence, the total number
of paths available in the network is polynomial, which can be enumerated in CACs. We present
three different sets of CACs to reduce r-HMIP2L to single level:
1. The first set of CACs is an extension of its counterpart for facility location problems
proposed by Church and Cohon (1976). These CACs are used by Lei (2013) to convert
the bilevel r-HMIP to single level. They are stated as follows:ÿ
pq,sqPCijkm
Xijqs `Xijkm ě zk ` zm ´ 1 @ i, j P N ; k,m P H (CAC1a)
where Cijkm = {pq, sq| dijqs ă dijkm or (dijqs “ dijkm and (q ă k or (q “ k and s ă m)))}.
For a given O-D pair pi, jq, CAC1a ensures that the flow between them is routed only
through a path that is no costlier than the path i Ñ k Ñ m Ñ j as long as hubs k
and m are open. CAC1a arbitrarily breaks any tie between paths having the same cost.
Breaking ties for r-HMIP is not necessary, unlike in facility location problems without
which it becomes infeasible. Hence, we can rewrite CAC1a as follows:ÿ
pq,sqPCˆijkm
Xijqs `Xijkm ě zk ` zm ´ 1 @ i, j P N ; k,m P H (CAC1b)
where Cˆijkm = {pq, sq| dijqs ă dijkm or (dijqs “ dijkm and (q ‰ k or (q “ k and s ‰ m)))}.
2. The second set of CACs forbids assignment of flows between any O-D pair (i, j) to a path
costlier than the path iÑ k Ñ mÑ j as long as hubs k and m are open. It is written as
follows: ÿ
pq,sqPEijkm
Xijqs ď 2´ zk ´ zm @ i, j P N ; k,m P H (CAC2)
where Eijkm = {pq, sq| dijqs ą dijkm}. CAC2 is similar to the constraint proposed by
Wagner and Falkson (1975) for p-center problems.
3. The third set of CACs, like CAC1b, ensures the flows between a given O-D pair (i, j) is

















dijqsXijqs ` pM ´ dijkmqpzk ` zm ´ 1q ďM @ i, j P N ; k,m P H (CAC3)
where M “ maxi,jPNtřkPH řmPH dijkmu.
In the above inequality, by fixing zk and zm to 1, the allocations Xijqs will be through
paths shorter than dijkm. CAC3 is an adaptation of the CAC used by Berman et al.
(2009) for facility location problems.












s.t. p2q, p3q, p5q ´ p7q
CAC1b or CAC2 or CAC3
Note that all the single-level reformulations of r-HMIPCAC that use CAC1 (CAC1b), CAC2,
and CAC3 have the same number of variables as the original bilevel r-HMIP2L. In order to
find the most efficient CACs among the proposed CACs for reduction, we study the dominance
relationships between them in the following subsection.
3.4. Dominance Relationship between CACs
The dominance relationship between CACs has been studied in the context of facility loca-
tion problems (Espejo et al., 2012). A constraint dominates another constraint if the former
yields a tighter LP relaxation than the latter. To prove that one constraint dominates the other,
one needs to show that the LP feasible region of the dominating constraint is a subset of the
LP feasible region of the dominated constraint. For studying the dominance relationship be-
tween CACs, the dominance rules we use are as follows: (i) a constraint dominates the another
constraint if the former implies the latter, but not the other way round; (ii) if both constraints
imply one another, we say that the constraints are equivalent.
Proposition 2. CAC2 is equivalent to CAC1b








Xijqs ě zk ` zm ´ 1 @ i, j P N ; k,m P H.
By separating Xijkm term, the above inequality can be rewritten as follows:ÿ
pq,sqPCˆijkm
Xijqs `Xijkm ě zk ` zm ´ 1 @ i, j P N ; k,m P H.
Hence, CAC2 ùñ CAC1b. Similarly, one can prove that CAC1b ùñ CAC2.
Therefore, CAC2 is equivalent to CAC1b.













Proof. To prove CAC2 dominates CAC3, we show that CAC2 ùñ CAC3 while CAC3 ­ùñ
CAC2.
We first prove CAC2 ùñ CAC3. For this we rewrite CAC2 as:
ÿ
pq,sqPEijkm
Xijqs ` zk ` zm ď 2 @ i, j P N ; k,m P H
Hence, the following is a relaxation of CAC2:
Xijqs ` zk ` zm ď 2 @i, j P N ; k,m P H; pq, sq P Eijkm (CAC2-rel)
It is evident that CAC2 ùñ CAC2-rel, while CAC2-rel ­ùñ CAC2. Therefore, CAC2
dominates CAC2-rel. To show that CAC2 dominates CAC3, we need to prove that CAC2-rel
either dominates or is equivalent to CAC3.












@ i, j P N ; k,m P H.
Adding
ř
pq,sq|dijqsďdijkm dijqsXijqs ` pM ´ dijkm ´
ř
pq,sqPEijkm dijqsqpzk ` zm ´ 1q to both













`pM ´ dijkmqpzk ` zm ´ 1q ´
ÿ
pq,sqPEijkm
dijqspzk ` zm ´ 1q @ i, j P N ; k,m P H.
(CAC2-rel2)
In the above inequality, the maximum value of the RHS (which corresponds to zk, zm = 1) is
always bounded by M since
ř





dijqsXijqs ` pM ´ dijkmqpzk ` zm ´ 1q ďM @ i, j P N ; k,m P H,
which proves that CAC2-rel ùñ CAC3. Since CAC2 dominates CAC2-rel, CAC2 dominates
CAC3.
Next, we prove CAC3 ­ùñ CAC2. This follows immediately from the following relations we
proved above:

















3.5. Reduced Formulations of CACs
In the following subsection, we present refinements of CAC1 and CAC2 that lead to fewer
constraints. These reduced formulations of CAC1 and CAC2 are based on constraint dominance
principles.
Proposition 4. For a given O-D pair (i, j) and hubs k and m (m ‰ k) between them,
CAC1bijkm dominates CAC1bijmk when dijkm ă dijmk.
Proof. To prove the above proposition, we show that CAC1bijkm ùñ CAC1bijmk while
CAC1bijmk ­ùñ CAC1bijkm when dijkm ă dijmk.








Xijqs ´ zk ´ zm ě ´1.
Also, Cˆijkm Y tpk,mqu Ă Cˆijmk Y tpm, kqu when dijkm ă dijmk. Hence, CAC1bijkm ùñ
CAC1bijmk while CAC1bijmk ­ùñ CAC1bijkm when dijmk ă dijmk.
Based on Proposition 4, we propose a new formulation for CAC1, which is given below. For
this, we define a set H 1ij “ tH2ijkm|k,m P H, k ď mu for each O-D pair (i, j), where
H2ijkm “
#
pk,mq if dijkm ď dijmk
pm, kq if dijkm ą dijmk.
The new CAC can then be written as follows:ÿ
pq,sqPCˆijkm
Xijqs `Xijkm ě zk ` zm ´ 1 @ i, j P N ; pk,mq P H 1ij (rCAC1)
The reduced constraint set rCAC1 has |N |2ppp2 ` pq{2q constraints whereas, CAC1 has
|N |2p2 constraints.
Proposition 5. For a given O-D pair (i, j) and hubs k and m (m ‰ k) between them, CAC2ijkm
dominates CAC2ijmk when dijkm ă dijmk.
Proof. To prove the above proposition, we show that CAC2bijkm ùñ CAC2bijmk while
CAC2bijmk ­ùñ CAC2bijkm when dijkm ă dijmk.








Xijqs ` zk ` zm ď 2.
Also, Eijkm Ą Eijmk when dijkm ă dijmk. Hence, CAC2bijkm ùñ CAC2bijmk while













Based on Proposition 5, we propose a new formulation for CAC, which is given below:ÿ
pq,sqPEijkm
Xijqs ď 2´ zk ´ zm @ i, j P N ; pk,mq P H 1ij . (rCAC2)
The reduced constraint set rCAC2 has |N |2ppp2 ` pq{2q constraints whereas, CAC2 has |N |2p2
constraints.
3.6. Advantages of CAC2 over CAC1
We outline the advantages of CAC2 over CAC1 at two stages of the solution process - the
presolve stage and the branch-and-bound stage. CAC2 has certain structural properties that
help in solving the single-level reformulation of HMIP faster than the one with CAC1. These
properties are also valid for rCAC2 since it is a tighter version of CAC2.
Advantages at presolve stage: Presolve procedure is executed by a commercial solver
prior to solving the optimization problem in order to reduce the size of the given problem by
removing the redundant variables and constraints. Probing is a process that is carried out at
the presolve step wherein logical consequences are investigated by setting the binary variables
at their bounds (Savelsbergh, 1994). We show that CAC2 and rCAC2 together with constraint
(6) eliminate a large number variables by probing.
Proposition 6. For a given O-D pair (i,j) and hub k, Xijkm variables that appear common in
(6) and CAC2ijkk can be set to zero.
Proof. For a given O-D pair (i, j) and hub k, consider the following possible two cases:
• zk = 0: variables that appear in both constraint (6) and CAC2ijkk are set to zero by
constraint (6).
• zk = 1: variables that appear in both constraint (6) and CAC2ijkk are set to zero by
CAC2ijkk.
Since the variables that appear in both constraint 6 and CAC2 are set to zero in either case,
they can be eliminated from the model prior to solving.
Thus, CAC2 and rCAC2 eliminate a large number of variables by probing. Despite CAC1
being equivalent to CAC2, probing using the former is not straightforward. However, CAC1
also eliminates some variables at presolve stage, although not as many as CAC2, as evident
later from computational results in Section4.
Advantages at branch-and-bound stage: In a branch-and-bound algorithm, the LP
relaxation of the MIP problem is solved at the root node. Further, branching is done by setting
the integer variables to its bounds that have taken a fractional value in the optimal solution to
the relaxed problem. In our problem, branching is done by setting zk variables to zero and one.
When a zk variable is set to one, some Xijkm variables are set to zero because of the CAC2
formulation. These variables can be eliminated from the model to reduce its size. Similarly,
when zk is set to zero, some Xijkm variables are eliminated because of constraint (6), which













4. Computational Comparison of Formulations
We present the results of our computational experiments to compare the computational
efficiencies of the different single level reformulations. For our experiments, we use instances
derived from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) dataset containing |N | “ 25 and p P t7, 10u.
The set of p hubs in the existing hub-and-spoke network for each of the instances is obtained
by solving a corresponding uncapacitated p-hub median problem (Ebery et al., 2000). All the
computational experiments are performed on a workstation with a 2.60GHz Intel Xeon - e5
processor and 24 GB RAM, and all the instances are solved using CPLEX 12.6.
In Table 1, we present the results for r P t1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8u. The discount factors for col-
lection (α) and distribution (γ) are both set at 1.0, while the discount factor for transshipment
(δ) is varied in the set t0.9, 0.5, 0.1u. The first set of columns lists the problem parameters: |N |,
p, r and δ. The second set of columns reports the size (number of constraints and variables)
and the CPU time for the single-level dual reformulation, r-HMIPDF . We also report the size
of the formulation (number of constraints and variables) before and after presolve operation for
the single-level r-HMIP for different variants of CACs. The column “Original Size” reports the
number of constraints and variables in the formulations before the presolve operation, which
is the same for the three unreduced variants of CACs (CAC1, CAC2, CAC3). For example,
for problem instances with N “ 25 and p “ 7, all the three formulations, r-HMIPCAC1, r-
HMIPCAC2 and r-HMIPCAC3, consist of 35,626 constraints and 30,633 variables. Similarly, for
N “ 25 and p “ 10, the number of constraints and variables are 69,376 and 62,511, respectively.
The number of constraints and variables after the presolve operation and the total CPU time
(in seconds) to solve the problem optimally for each of the CAC formulations are reported under













Table 1: Comparison between different single level reformulations of r-HMIP using CAB dataset
N p r δ
r-HMIPDF Original Size - CACs r-HMIPCAC1 r-HMIPCAC2 r-HMIPCAC3 r-HMIPrCAC1 r-HMIPrCAC2
Cons. Var. CPU(s) Cons Var. Cons. Var. CPU(s) Cons. Var. CPU(s) Cons. Var. CPU(s) Cons. Var. CPU(s) Cons. Var. CPU(s)
25 7 1 0.9 4390 5015 7 35626 30633 9911 8619 4 1329 845 2 34986 30058 43 6611 8619 3 1329 845 2
2 6 27593 23775 15 10383 4655 5 35094 30058 47 18377 23479 8 10365 4655 4
3 7 27593 23775 17 10383 4655 6 35094 30058 69 18377 23479 12 10365 4655 5
4 5 27593 23775 22 10383 4655 5 35094 30058 98 18377 23479 16 10365 4655 5
5 2 27593 23775 13 10383 4655 3 35094 30058 83 18377 23479 10 10365 4655 2
1 0.5 9 19519 17015 7 3713 2405 3 34964 30058 46 12815 17015 5 3713 2405 3
2 10 29809 25835 18 11220 6567 7 35094 30058 48 19645 25529 12 10904 6567 6
3 10 29809 25835 30 11220 6567 7 35094 30058 51 19645 25529 19 10904 6567 8
4 8 29809 25835 28 11220 6567 11 35094 30058 80 19645 25529 19 10904 6567 8
5 5 29809 25835 9 11220 6567 3 35094 30058 88 19645 25529 6 7817 4922 3
1 0.1 12 26581 23197 11 6303 4143 3 34996 30058 47 17061 23197 7 6303 4143 3
2 12 31579 27481 28 13176 8669 12 35094 30058 52 20280 27167 16 12956 8669 9
3 13 31579 27481 43 13176 8669 10 35094 30058 70 20280 27167 25 12956 8669 10
4 10 31579 27481 36 13176 8669 10 35094 30058 73 20280 27167 20 12956 8669 11
5 7 31579 27481 8 13176 8669 3 35094 30058 38 20280 27167 5 12956 8669 3
10 1 0.9 6271 6896 13 69376 62511 28475 25786 14 1743 1102 7 68135 61285 90 17441 25786 9 1743 1102 7
2 14 58805 53083 48 14045 6741 12 68241 61285 163 35957 52397 25 14027 6741 11
3 10 58805 53083 61 14045 6741 13 68241 61285 393 35957 52397 34 14027 6741 12
4 21 58805 53083 74 14045 6741 16 68241 61285 425 35957 52397 45 14027 6741 13
5 22 58805 53083 67 14045 6741 15 68241 61285 520 35957 52397 40 14027 6741 13
6 16 58805 53083 82 14045 6741 12 68241 61285 659 35957 52397 44 14027 6741 12
7 15 58805 53083 96 14045 6741 14 68241 61285 2504 35957 52397 33 14027 6741 11
8 12 58805 53083 49 14045 6741 8 68241 61285 914 35957 52397 40 14027 6741 7
1 0.5 17 45559 41340 22 5301 3430 8 68099 61285 83 27655 41340 14 5301 3430 7
2 29 62389 56487 64 17091 9895 18 68241 61285 150 37917 55765 33 16807 9895 17
3 25 62389 56487 84 17091 9895 22 68241 61285 288 37917 55765 52 16807 9895 19
4 42 62389 56487 115 17091 9895 25 68241 61285 325 37917 55765 58 16807 9895 23
5 32 62389 56487 104 17091 9895 21 68241 61285 572 37917 55765 64 16807 9895 20
6 23 62389 56487 109 17091 9895 19 68241 61285 526 37917 55765 59 16807 9895 20
7 17 62389 56487 115 17091 9895 18 68241 61285 738 37917 55765 60 16807 9895 18
8 15 62389 56487 47 17091 9895 9 68241 61285 1198 37917 55765 28 16807 9895 8
1 0.1 27 56371 51118 36 9639 6468 9 68203 61285 96 34049 51118 20 9639 6468 8
2 50 64741 58721 62 21443 14681 25 68241 61285 137 39119 57964 41 21055 14681 21
3 37 64741 58721 83 21443 14681 26 68241 61285 250 39119 57964 53 21055 14681 27
4 58 64741 58721 178 21443 14681 37 68241 61285 358 39119 57964 93 21055 14681 35
5 42 64741 58721 152 21443 14681 45 68241 61285 526 39119 57964 66 21055 14681 45
6 49 64741 58721 127 21443 14681 39 68241 61285 518 39119 57964 71 21055 14681 39
7 38 64741 58721 99 21443 14681 31 68241 61285 468 39119 57964 53 21055 14681 30
8 15 64741 58721 31 21443 14681 11 68241 61285 299 39119 57964 19 21055 14681 10













From Table 1, we make the following observations:
• The results clearly highlight the computational inefficiency of r-HMIPCAC3, as highlighted
by its relatively higher CPU times compared to the other formulations. This is mainly
due to a weak LP relaxation of r-HMIPCAC3, besides the large problem size post-presolve.
• A comparison of the results between r-HMIPCAC1 and r-HMIPCAC2 shows that the latter
speeds up the computation by a factor of 2 to 4 for instances with p “ 7, and by a factor
of 2 to 7 for instances with p “ 10, as highlighted by their relative CPU times. This gain
comes largely from the elimination of a substantially larger proportion of the variables
and constraints post-presolve in r-HMIPCAC2 compared to r-HMIPCAC1.
• The size of the reduced formulation r-HMIPrCAC1 post-presolve is significantly smaller,
resulting in a reduction in its CPU times by a factor of 1.5 to 2, compared to its original
r-HMIPCAC1 formulation.
• The reduced formulation r-HMIPrCAC2 post-presolve has almost the same size as its
original formulation r-HMIPCAC2, hence yielding only marginal additional savings in CPU
times.
• The dual based formulation r-HMIPDF is computationally more efficient than r-HMIPCAC1
and r-HMIPCAC3, but not as efficient as r-HMIPCAC2 and r-HMIPrCAC2.
• Compared to r-HMIPrCAC1, r-HMIPrCAC2 results in savings in CPU time by a factor of
1.5 to 6.
In summary, the results for small instances in Table 1 show that r-HMIPDF , r-HMIPCAC2
and r-HMIPrCAC2 are computationally more efficient formulations, as highlighted by their sig-
nificantly lower CPU times, compared to the rest. Amongst these three, r-HMIPrCAC2 requires
the lowest CPU times for 35 out of the 39 problem instances, and r-HMIPCAC2 requires the
lowest CPU times for the remaining 4 instances. Although CPU time for r-HMIPDF is not the
lowest for any of these 39 instances, it is not significantly worse than the lowest CPU time for
any of these instances.
In Table 2, we present additional computational results using 12 larger problem instances
derived from the AP dataset with 100 and 200 nodes, for the three most efficient formulations,
namely r-HMIPCAC2, r-HMIPrCAC2, and r-HMIPDF , as highlighted above. The discount fac-
tors for collection (α), transshipment (δ), and distribution (γ) are set to 3, 0.75, and 2, respec-
tively. Like the computational results reported in Table 1, the set of p hubs in the existing
hub-and-spoke network for each of these 12 instances is obtained by solving a corresponding
uncapacitated p-hub median problem (Ebery et al., 2000). CPLEX is able to solve all the 12
instances using the r-HMIPDF formulation. However, CPLEX is able to solve only 4 of them
using the r-HMIPCAC2 and r-HMIPrCAC2 formulations, and using CPU times that are up to
an order-of-magnitude larger compared to r-HMIPDF . The remaining 8 instances, indicated
by “Memory” against their CPU times, cannot be solved due to memory limitations of the
hardware used in the experiments.
In the following section, we further exploit the structure of r-HMIPDF , HMIPCAC2 and r-
HMIPrCAC2 using Benders decomposition. Benders decomposition has been successfully applied













Table 2: Comparison between dual based and CAC based single level reformulations of r-HMIP using AP dataset
CPLEX
Parameters r-HMIPDF r-HMIPCAC2 r-HMIPrCAC2
|N | p r Gap CPU(s) Gap CPU(s) Gap CPU(s)
100 10 5 0 1,476 0 8,881 0 8,315
6 0 935 0 6,039 0 5,070
7 0 891 0 4,299 0 3,996
8 0 328 0 3,395 0 3,255
15 5 0 6,328 - Memory - Memory
6 0 8,913 - Memory - Memory
7 0 8,092 - Memory - Memory
8 0 6,035 - Memory - Memory
200 10 5 0 21,948 - Memory - Memory
6 0 22,505 - Memory - Memory
7 0 19,190 - Memory - Memory
8 0 6,787 - Memory - Memory
α = 3, δ = 0.75, γ = 2.
“Memory” denotes insufficient memory to solve the problem
and Hub Location (de Camargo et al., 2008, 2009; Contreras et al., 2011a). Since the single
level reformulations of r-HMIP bear similarity with the hub location models, we expect Benders
decomposition to be successful here as well.
5. Benders Decomposition for HMIP
Benders decomposition is a well-known method of partitioning an MIP into an integer master
problem and a linear sub-problem (Benders, 1962). In this section, we present Benders decompo-
sition for the three efficient HMIP formulations: r-HMIPDF , r-HMIPCAC2 and r-HMIPrCAC2.
We also discuss the computational gain from Benders decomposition of r-HMIPrCAC2 relative
to that from the Benders decomposition of r-HMIPCAC2, which is otherwise not possible when
solving the two formulations directly using CPLEX.
5.1. Benders Decomposition of r-HMIPDF
Let Z “ tzk P t0, 1u|řkPH zk “ p ´ ru. For any fixed binary solution z¯ P Z, the resulting
problem in the space of φ, δ and V variables, which we refer to as the primal sub-problem (PS),
can be stated as:










s.t. φij ´ δijk ďWijdijkm @i, j P N ;@k,m P H, k “ m (18)
φij ´ δijk ´ δijm ďWijdijkm @i, j P N ;@k,m P H, k ‰ m (19)






δijk ´Mkp1´ szkq @k P H (21)
φij unbounded; δijk ě 0;Vk ě 0; @i, j P N ;@k P H (22)













(20), and (21), respectively. The dual of the sub-problem can be stated as follows:



























χijmk ď ωk @i, j P N ;@k P H (25)
τk ´ ωk ě ´1 @k P H (26)
χijkm, τk, ωk ě 0 @i, j P N ;@k,m P H (27)
The above dual minimization problem is bounded since all the variables in the problem (χijkm,
τk and ωk) are positive. Denoting the set of all extreme points of DSDF by EPDF , the master
problem for r-HMIPDF is as follows:




















Mkp1´ zkqsωk @psχijkm, sτk, sωkq P EPDF (30)
θ ě 0, zk P t0, 1u @k P H (31)
Solving the master problem with the addition of Benders cut (30) gives the upper bound, while
the sub-problem gives a lower bound to the original problem. The algorithm terminates when
the difference between upper and the best lower bound falls within a pre-specified tolerance .
5.2. Benders Decomposition of r-HMIPCAC2
Let Z “ tzk P t0, 1u|řkPH zk “ p ´ ru. For any fixed binary solution z¯ P Z, the resulting























Xijmk ď szk @ i, j P N, k P H (34)ÿ
pq,sqPEijkm
Xijqs ď 2´ szk ´ szm @ i, j P N, k,m P H (35)















































β1ijqs ` λ1ijk ` φ1ij ěWijdijkm @ i, j P N, k,m P H, k “ m
(38)ÿ
pq,sq|dijqsădijkm






ijk ě 0 @ i, j P N, k,m P H
(40)
The above dual minimization problem is bounded since the variables λ1ijk and β
1
ijkm are positive,
and the constraints (38) and (39) ensure that the free variable φ1ij has a finite lower bound.
Denoting the set of all extreme points of DSCAC2 by EPCAC2, the master problem for r-



























Ďβ1ijkmp2´ zk ´ zmq @pĎφ1ij ,Ďλ1ijk,Ďβ1ijkmq P EPCAC2
(43)
θ ě 0, zk P t0, 1u @k P H (44)
Solving the master problem with the addition of Benders cut (43) gives the upper bound, while
the sub-problem gives a lower bound to the original problem. The algorithm terminates when
the difference between upper and the best lower bound falls within a pre-specified tolerance.
gap.
5.3. Benders Decomposition of r-HMIPrCAC2
Let Z “ tzk P t0, 1u|řkPH zk “ p ´ ru. For any fixed binary solution z¯ P Z, the primal





































Xijqs ď 2´ szk ´ szm @ i, j P N, pk,mq P H 1ij (48)
Xijkm ě 0 @ i, j P N, k,m P H (49)




ijkm as the dual variables with the constraints (46), (47) and (48),



























β2ijqs ` λ2ijk ` φ2ij ěWijdijkm @ i, j P N, k,m P H, k “ m (51)
ÿ
pq,sqPB1ijkm
β2ijqs ` λ2ijk ` λ2ijm ` φ2ij ěWijdijkm @ i, j P N, k,m P H, k ‰ m (52)
β2ijkm ě 0 @ i, j P N, pk,mq P H 1ij (53)
φ2ij unbounded;λ
2
ijk ě 0 @ i, j P N, k P H (54)
where B1ijkm= tpq, sq|dijqs ă dijkm; @pq, sq P H 1iju.
The above dual minimization sub-problem is bounded since the variables λ2ijk and β
2
ijkm are
positive, and the constraints (51) and (52) ensure that the free variable φ2ij has a finite lower
bound. Denoting the set of all extreme points of DSrCAC2 by EPrCAC2, the master problem

























Ďβ2ijkmp2´ zk ´ zmq @pĎφ2ij ,Ďλ2ijk,Ďβ2ijkmq P EPrCAC2
(57)
θ ě 0, zk P t0, 1u @k P H
(58)
Solving the master problem with the addition of Benders cut (57) gives the upper bound, while
the sub-problem gives a lower bound to the original problem. The algorithm terminates when
the difference between upper and the best lower bound falls within a pre-specified tolerance .
Remark: As evident from the computational results in Table 1, rCAC2 does not enjoy
significant computational advantage over CAC2 when solving the resulting single-level r-HMIP
formulations with these CACs directly using CPLEX since both these models are approximately













constraints) after the presolve operation. However, when the single level r-HMIP is decomposed
into a master problem consisting of only the binary variables (zk) and a sub-problem consisting
of only the continuous variables (Xijkm), presolve loses its effect. Nonetheless, with Benders
decomposition, the dual sub-problem (50)-(54) resulting from the use of rCAC2 has fewer vari-
ables (βijkm) compared to the dual sub-problem (37)-(40) resulting from the use of CAC2. With
|N | nodes and p hubs, the use of rCAC2 and CAC2 result in |N |2pp2 ` pq{2 and |N |2p2 βijkm
variables, respectively. For example, a problem instance with |N | “ 200 and p “ 10 results
in 2,200,000 βijkm variables with the use of rCAC2, which is otherwise 4,000,000 with the use
of CAC2. Thus, rCAC2 aids in the reduction in the size of the dual sub-problem by a factor
of 0.5 ` p0.5{pq, which tends to 0.5 as p becomes large. We expect Benders decomposition to
benefit from this reduction in the size of the dual sub-problem with rCAC2, and provide a
computational advantage over CAC2.
5.4. Computational Results
We now repeat the computational experiments, using the same 12 instances as in Table 2,
for the Benders decomposition of the three formulations, namely r-HMIPDF , r-HMIPCAC2,
and r-HMIPrCAC2. For ease of comparison of Benders decomposition with the direct solu-
tion using CPLEX, we also present the computational results already reported in Table 2.
Recall that r-HMIPCAC2 and r-HMIPrCAC2 performed significantly worse than r-HMIPDF
when solved directly using CPLEX. In that case, CPLEX was able to solve all the 12 in-
stances using r-HMIPDF . On the other hand, it could solve only 4 of them using r-HMIPCAC2
and r-HMIPrCAC2, while the remaining 8 instances could not be solved due to memory lim-
itations of the hardware used in the experiments. With Benders decomposition, the perfor-
mances of r-HMIPCAC2 and r-HMIPrCAC2 improve drastically, while that of r-HMIPDF be-
comes worse. With Benders decomposition, we are now able to solve all the 12 instances using
the r-HMIPrCAC2 formulation within the 10 hour (36,000 seconds) CPU time limit. On the
other hand, we can now solve only 4 (of the 12) instances using r-HMIPDF , while the remaining
8 instances cannot be solved due to memory limitations of the hardware.
Finally, the results highlight that only two formulations, namely r-HMIPDF and Benders
decomposition of r-HMIPrCAC2, could solve all the 12 large instances of the problem. Further,
for the 100-node instances, r-HMIPDF outperforms (in terms of CPU time) the Benders de-
composition of r-HMIPrCAC2 on 5 out of 8 problem instances. On the remaining 3 instances,
Benders decomposition of r-HMIPrCAC2 performs better. Whereas for the 200-node problem
instances, Benders decomposition outperforms r-HMIPDF by a factor of 4-8. Hence, r-HMIPDF
performance better for smaller instances of the problem, while for larger instances, Benders de-
composition of r-HMIPrCAC2 is clearly better. This observation is consistent with the remarks
made in the previous subsection regarding the computational advantage of Benders decompo-
sition of r-HMIPrCAC2 formulation.
6. Hub Protection Problem
In hub protection problems, the defender seeks to protect/fortify a subset of hubs against
interdiction. In this section, we study a u-hub median protection problem (u-HMPP) in a
multiple allocation hub-and-spoke network with p existing hubs. Figure 2 shows a schematic
representation of u-HMPP studied in this paper. The problem is modeled as a Stackelberg













Table 3: Comparison between Benders decomposition of dual based and CAC based single level reformulations
of r-HMIP using AP dataset
CPLEX Benders Decomposition
Parameters r-HMIPDF r-HMIPCAC2 r-HMIPrCAC2 r-HMIPDF r-HMIPCAC2 r-HMIPrCAC2
|N | p r Gap CPU(s) Gap CPU(s) Gap CPU(s) Gap CPU(s) Gap CPU(s) Gap CPU(s)
100 10 5 0 1,476 0 8,881 0 8,315 0 2,334 0 1,212 0 1,100
6 0 935 0 6,039 0 5,070 0 1,978 0 1,290 0 1,034
7 0 891 0 4,299 0 3,996 0 1,175 0 562 0 444
8 0 328 0 3,395 0 3,255 0 195 0 310 0 233
15 5 0 6,328 - Memory - Memory - Memory 87% 36,000 0 21,080
6 0 8,913 - Memory - Memory - Memory 86% 36,000 0 24,091
7 0 8,092 - Memory - Memory - Memory 94% 36,000 0 20,606
8 0 6,035 - Memory - Memory - Memory 85% 36,000 0 14,956
200 10 5 0 21,948 - Memory - Memory - Memory 42% 36,000 0 5,779
6 0 22,505 - Memory - Memory - Memory 26% 36,000 0 3,328
7 0 19,190 - Memory - Memory - Memory 0 18,572 0 2,274
8 0 6,787 - Memory - Memory - Memory 0 8,109 0 1,180
α = 3, δ = 0.75, γ = 2
“Memory” denotes insufficient memory to solve the problem
from an existing set H of p hubs with the objective to maximize the defender’s optimal rout-
ing/transportation cost through the p´r surviving hubs in the network post-interdiction, which
is modeled as r-HMIP2L, as studied extensively in Section 3 and 4. The defender, in anticipa-
tion of the attacker’s action, seeks to protect a subset of u hubs from the existing set of p hubs
in the network such that its post-interdiction optimal routing cost through the p´ r surviving
hubs, which the attacker intends to maximize, is as small as possible.
While protection problems have been widely studied in the context of facility location
(Church and Scaparra, 2007b; Scaparra and Church, 2008a,b; Aksen et al., 2010; Scaparra
and Church, 2012; Aksen and Aras, 2012; Aksen et al., 2013), they have received little attention
in the context of hub-and-spoke networks, with Lei (2013) and Ghaffarinasab and Atayi (2017),
to the best of our knowledge, being the only two papers in the area. Lei (2013) presented a
trilevel MIP formulation for multiple allocation u-HMPP, which is reduced to a bilevel MIP
using CAC1. However, no solution method or computational results were reported. Ghaffari-
nasab and Atayi (2017) solved large instances of the u-HMPP using an implicit enumeration
procedure. In this section, we study the same trilevel MIP formulation as Lei (2013). However,
we reduce the trilevel formulation to bilevel using rCAC2, which has been shown to perform
the best among the different CACs discussed in Section 3 and Section 4 above. This allows us
to solve large instances of u-HMPP using an efficient algorithm based on implicit enumeration



















Objective: Minimize routing cost after interdiction
Objective: Maximize the defender’s routing cost
Decision: Which r hubs to interdict out of the remaining p−u unprotected hubs?
Decision: How to route the flow through the remaining hubs?
Variable type: Binary
Objective: Minimize the attacker’s interdiction cost
Variable type: Continuous
Level 2: Attacker’s problem (Hub interdiction)
Decision: Which u hubs to protect? 
Variable type: Binary
Level 1: Defender’s problem (Hub protection)
Level 3: Defender’s problem (Routing problem)
Figure 2: Hub protection problem as a tri-level MIP
6.1. Model Formulation
To formulate u-HMPP, we define yk = 1 if hub k is protected, 0 otherwise. With this new







yk “ u (60)










The defender’s problem of protecting a subset of u out of an existing set of p hubs is given
by (59)-(61) at level 1. He takes this decision in anticipation of the attacker’s decision, which
is modeled as a bilevel r-HMIP, as described in Section 3, with the additional constraint (63)
to ensure that a protected hub cannot be attacked. For feasibility, we ensure that u ` r ď p.
As discussed in Section 3, the lower bilevel r-HMIP can be reduced to single level using CACs.





























s.t.(5)´ (7), (63), r-CAC2
6.2. Implicit Enumeration Algorithm
We present an implicit enumeration algorithm for solving u-HMPP, inspired by the solution
method proposed by Scaparra and Church (2008a) for r-interdiction median problem with
fortification (r-IMF). The algorithm is based on the proposition that the optimal solution to
r-IMF will necessarily contain at least one of the facilities interdicted in r-interdiction median
problem (r-IMP) since any other combination of protected facilities will not prevent the worst
scenario for the defender.
The implicit enumeration algorithm for u-HMPP is described as follows. At the root node
of the search tree, the algorithm solves an r-HMIP, yielding r interdicted hubs. The root node
is then branched into r children nodes, each corresponding to the protection of a hub k (by
setting yk “ 1) out of the r interdicted hubs. At each of these r nodes, it solves a conditional
hub interdiction problem (CHIP), which is an HMIP with the restriction that the protected
hub k cannot be interdicted (imposed using constraint set (63)). The solution to each of these
CHIPs gives r interdicted hubs. Each of these nodes is, in turn, branched into r children nodes,
each corresponding to the protection of a hub k (by setting yk “ 1) out of the r interdicted
hubs, in addition to the hubs protected at its parent node. This procedure is repeated until
the number of protected hubs on the path starting from the root node to the current node is u.
Any node at which u hubs are protected is called a leaf node. When each of the paths from the
root node terminates in a leaf node, then the node with the lowest objective function value to
its corresponding CHIP provides the solution to u-HMPP. If at any stage, the algorithm visits
a node correspondng to a set of protected hubs, which is the same as that corresponding to
some other already visited node, then the algorithm skips that node, since CHIPs at both the
nodes are the same. At each node in the search tree, HMIP/CHIP is reduced to a single level
MIP using rCAC2, which is solved using Benders decomposition.
To summarize the above procedure, we use :y and :z to denote the optimal solution vector to
the protection and interdiction variables, respectively. Further, :θ denotes the optimal objective
function value to u-HMPP. Let r0 denote the root node of the search tree, and S denote the set
of nodes in the tree to be visited. We define the following two sets associated with each node n:
Cn is the set of candidate hubs to be protected in the subsequent nodes on the subpath starting
from node n; Fn is the set of hubs protected on the path from root to node n. We also define a
set F , which stores the set of protected hubs at all the nodes visited by the algorithm.
We use CHIP(Fn) to denote CHIP with the additional restriction that the hubs in Fn cannot














Algorithm 1 Implicit Enumeration
1: procedure Implicit Enumeration
2: F Ð φ
3: Fr0 Ð φ
4: :yk Ð 0 @k P H.
5: Solve CHIP(Fr0). zˆ Ð tk| zk “ 0u; θˆ Ð obj. fun. value of CHIP(Fr0)
6: :θ Ð θˆ; Cr0 = tk| zˆk “ 0u; S = tr0u
7: while S ‰ φ do
8: select n P S
9: while Cn ‰ φ do
10: Select k P Cn
11: Cn Ð Cnztku
12: Generate node n1 with Fn1 = Fn Y tku
13: while Fn1 R F do
14: F “ F Y tFn1u
15: Solve CHIP(Fn1). zˆ Ð tk| zk “ 0u; θˆ Ð obj. fun. value of CHIP(Fn)
16: if |Fn1 | “ q then
17: if θˆ ă :θ then
18: :z Ð zˆ; :θ Ð θˆ
19: for k P H do
20: if k P Fn1 then
21: :yk = 1








30: end whilereturn :θ, :y, :z
31: end procedure
The proposed implicit enumeration procedure examines r0 ` r1 ` r2 ` .... ` ru = rpu`1q´1r´1





CHIPs in complete enumeration of the set of q protected hubs. To speed
up the implicit enumeration algorithm, we next explore ways to solve HIPs/CHIPs efficiently.
Remark: Since the feasible region of the optimization problem at any child node is a strict
subset of the corresponding feasible region of its parent node, the benders cuts generated in
solving the parent node remains valid for its children also. Therefore, in the implicit enumeration
algorithm, we retain those benders cuts of the parent nodes in each of their children nodes
to ensure faster convergence of the corresponding optimization problem. This reduces the
computational time for u-HMPP problem instances significantly.
6.3. Computational Results
Table 4 provides a comparison of the computational performance of the implicit enumeration
algorithm versus complete enumeration for 12 different problem instances derived from AP













discount factors are set to: α “ 3, δ “ 0.75, γ “ 2. The results show that implicit enumeration
algorithm is much faster, providing a reduction of 43% - 85% in CPU times, compared to
complete enumeration.
Table 4: Computational results for hub protection problems with AP datasets
Complete Enumeration Implicit Enumeration % Reduction
|N | p r u CPU(s) CPU(s) in CPU Time
50 10 5 1 845 313 63
5 2 2,922 485 84
6 1 656 312 53
6 2 2,039 689 67
7 1 413 210 50
7 2 1,320 485 64
100 10 5 1 3,820 1,454 61
5 2 13,176 2,063 85
6 1 3,103 1,320 58
6 2 8,908 1,919 79
7 1 1,956 1,119 43
7 2 5,356 1,955 64
Min. 413 210 43
Avg. 3,710 1027 64
Max. 13,176 2063 85
α “ 3, δ “ 0.75, γ “ 2
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied multiple allocation r-HMIP and multiple allocation u-HMPP for
hub-and-spoke networks by formulating them as bilevel and trilevel MIP problems, respectively.
For the bilevel r-HMIP, we explored two alternate ways to reduce it to a single-level optimization
problem. The first approach uses the dual formulation of the lower level routing problem to
reduce it to single-level, while the second approach exploits the structure of the solution to the
lower level problem using CACs. We studied alternate forms of CACs, the dominance relation
among them, and their computational performances. The results indicate that the best among
our proposed alternate sets of CACs provides a computational advantage (in terms of reduced
CPU times) by a factor of 7 compared to the set of CACs proposed in the literature. We
further provided reduced versions of the alternate sets of CACs, one of which in conjunction
with Benders decomposition was able to solve all the 12 large instances (with 100 and 200
nodes) of r-HMIP to optimality within the given CPU time limit (of 10 hours), and was also
significantly faster than the dual based formulation for very large instances (with 200 nodes).
The computational efficiency gained for r-HMIP by using CACs and Benders decomposition
allowed us to further solve large instances of an otherwise intractable u-HMPP.
The current work opens up a number of exciting possibilities for future research. One of
the natural extensions of the problems studied in this paper is the single allocation versions
of r-HMIP and u-HMPP, which are more challenging to solve than their multiple allocation
counterparts. The main challenge in solving the single allocation versions arises from the fact
that the lower level problem in r-HMIP is an MIP, which eliminates the possibility of reducing
it to single level using the dual method. Further, the CACs presented for multiple allocation













any O-D pair pi, jq in this case need not necessarily be routed through the least cost avail-
able path due to the restriction that any node should be assigned to a single hub. Another
interesting extension of our study is to consider the possibility of interdiction at the design of
the hub network itself. As discussed in Section 2, Parvaresh et al. (2013, 2014) are the only
two papers to our knowledge to have studied this problem. However, both these papers use
heuristic based solution approaches. We see exact solution approaches for this problem as an
interesting research avenue. Yet another interesting extension is to incorporate uncertainties
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